Moldova
| FORECAST* | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Economic Indicators | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
| Population, 1000 persons | 2596 | 2539 | 2580 | . | . | . |
| GDP, real change in % | 13.9 | -4.6 | 0.7 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 10020 | 10430 | 10510 | . | . | . |
| Gross industrial production, real change in % | 12.1 | -5.1 | -3.6 | . | . | . |
| Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 3.2 | 3.1 | 4.6 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 3.5 |
| Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 429 | 525 | 624 | . | . | . |
| Consumer prices, % p.a. | 5.1 | 28.7 | 13.4 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 |
| Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -1.9 | -3.2 | -5.2 | -4.0 | -3.5 | -3.0 |
| Public debt in % of GDP | 32.6 | 35.0 | 36.0 | . | . | . |
| Current account in % of GDP | -12.4 | -17.1 | -11.9 | -9.7 | -8.9 | -8.1 |
| FDI inflow, EUR m | 326 | 557 | 386 | . | . | . |
| Gross external debt in % of GDP | 66.7 | 65.4 | 61.5 | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
publication_icon
Monthly Report No. 1/2024
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Selena Duraković, Meryem Gökten, Richard Grieveson, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Marko Sošić, Bernd Christoph Ströhm, Maryna Tverdostup and Adam Żurawski
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2024
50 pages including 5 Tables and 18 Figures
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Executive summary
Branimir Jovanović
in: Beneath the Veneer of Calm
wiiw Forecast Report No. Autumn 2023, October 2023 , pp. I-VI
Details
Economic growth will pick up to 3.5% in 2024, following a very modest showing of 0.7% last year. Inflation will stabilise at a low level, allowing for monetary policy to be loosened. The current account and fiscal deficits will remain relatively high, but multinational institutions will provide a stable source of financing. The Europe-oriented leadership will be challenged in October in a presidential election and a referendum on EU membership. Russia’s subversive activities and domestic oligarchic interests support a strong opposition.