pesticide maximum residue level mrl enforcement system in june 2008 the united states noted that in may 2006 japans ministry of health labour and welfare mhlw imposed a testing and sanctions policy that involved increased testing 30 per cent country-wide after the occurrence of one mrl violation. if a second violation involving the same pesticide and commodity occurred within one year of the first a 100 per cent test-and-hold policy was enforced on all exports of that commodity from that country. the united states believed that the sanctions under inspection and control programmes should be limited to the violating supplier as long as there was no indication that a country-wide problem existed. the united states considered that this would be the least trade restrictive measure and the most appropriate policy. this was also the policy applied by the united states itself. china supported the concerns raised by the united states and invited japan to provide scientific justification for its measure in order to comply with the sps agreement. japan stated that the mrls for agricultural chemicals in food were developed based on scientific assessments and took into account the mrls established by codex and by other countries. before adopting a new mrl japan notified its proposal to the wto and considered any comments from members as appropriate. the mrls applied equally to domestic and imported products. whenever non-compliance with an mrl was found in imported products japan strengthened inspections of agricultural chemical residues. the degree frequency or extent of enhanced inspection was determined by the circumstances. each violation was handled on a case-by-case basis but always conducted in a rational and reasonable manner for instance by limiting the enhanced inspections to the violating exporter only. in october 2008 the united states again raised its concerns about japans enforcement system for mrls. in particular there was no reason for japan to employ country-wide sanctions where there was no indication of a country-wide problem. in cases of individual company violations sanctions should be applied at the individual company level. new zealand noted that its exports had been subject to testing by japan. new zealand asked for further clarification regarding the reasons behind testing products especially asparagus products as these were normally frozen. china shared the us concerns regarding japans testing regime. japan responded that in order to enforce their mrls japan conducted monitoring inspections of agricultural chemical residues in imported food. these controls were strengthened if imported products did not comply with the established mrls. multiple violations had been detected on imported products from the united states giving rise to increased monitoring. in february 2009 the united states indicated that japans mrl enforcement policy imposed on us specialty products continued to be of great concern. this policy imposed industry wide testing for pesticides after one mrl violation by a single party. if a second violation involving the same pesticide and commodity occurred within one year a 100 per cent test-and-hold policy of all exports from that country was enforced. japan indicated that the mrls had been developed based on scientific assessments taking into account codex standards and that they were applied both to domestic and imported products. when there were instances of non-compliance inspections were strengthened taking into account various factors on a case-by-case basis. japan had confirmed that the us regulation on pesticide residues was equivalent to japans. where us mrls were equal to or stricter than japans the enhanced inspections were limited to the specific exporter. in cases where the us mrl was higher than japans japan needed to ensure that us exporters as a whole complied with japans mrl. such evidence should be provided by the us government itself or in some other way. in fact japans