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The trade and demand nexus: Do global value chains matter?

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The trade and demand nexus: Do global value chains matter?

WORK IN PROGRESS...

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wiiw Seminar in International Economics
26 November 2015

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
Motivation

Puzzle 1: Trade grew consistently faster than GDP.

Puzzle 2: The trade-GDP ratio declined.

**Global import growth relative to
GDP growth (in PPP)**


— average 1981-2007 — average 2011-2014



Source: ECB staff calculations.

Global trade relative to GDP

(ratio of world imports to world GDP, index 2005 = 100)




Source: National data.

Notes: The last observation refers to 2015Q2.

Motivation

Puzzle 1: Trade grew consistently faster than GDP.

Puzzle 2: The trade-GDP ratio declined since the mid-90s.



Source: ECB staff calculations.

Ratios of global import to GDP growth

Sample period	Ratio ¹	Trade variable	Output variable
1981Q1-2007Q4	1.9	Imports of goods and services	GDP (PPP)
2011Q3-2015Q2	0.8		
1981Q1-2007Q4	2.1	Imports of goods and services	GDP (MER)
2011Q3-2015Q2	1.1		
1951-2007	1.6	Merchandise exports	Merchandise production
1981-2007	2.0		
2011-2014	1.4		
1951-2007	1.6	Manufacturing exports	Manufacturing production
1981-2007	2.1		
2011-2014	1.5		

Sources: WTO, national data, Haver and IMF.

1 Imports and GDP: quarterly data; exports and production, annual data.

- Trade weak relative to GDP across various sectors and aggregation methods.
- Decline in trade growth geographically broad based

Motivation

- Standard trade models failed to explain changes in trade-GDP growth ratio
- Reasons for these changes are unknown, cyclical or structural? 
- This paper analyses the role of GVCs in this context (= possible structural reason).
- We include indicators for the participation in GVCs in a standard import demand equation.
- Alternatively, one could analyse differences between gross and value added trade.

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- **Yi (2001):**
 - Falling trade barriers too weak and too early to explain high trade growth, but vertical specialisation can explain the puzzle
- **Eaton, Kortum & Romalis (2011):**
 - During the crisis, spending shifted away from durable goods → composition effect hypothesis
- **Alessandria, Kaboski & Midrigan (2010); Altomonte, di Mauro, Ottaviano, Rungi & Vicard (2012); Bems, Johnson & Yi (2012):**
 - Disproportionally large inventories in GVC trade, higher sensitivity of trade to foreign income shocks, bullwhip effect → supply chain effect hypothesis
- **Constantinescu, Mattoo & Ruta (2015):**
 - decline in trade-GDP ratio started long before the crisis, thus reflecting longer term structural reasons
- **Ollivaud & Schwellnus (2015):**
 - No decline in the ratio with correct GDP measurement and treatment of intra-EU flows, thus weak global demand is responsible

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Import demand function


$$\ln(M_{ijt}) = \alpha_{ij} + \alpha_1 \ln(TFE_{it}) + \alpha_2 \ln\left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{it}}\right) + \alpha_3 \ln(ER_{ijt}) + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

... augmented by an index of GVC participation:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln(M_{ijt}) = & \gamma_{ij} + \gamma_1 \ln(TFE_{it}) + \gamma_2 \ln\left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{it}}\right) + \gamma_3 \ln(ER_{ijt}) \\ & + \gamma_4 \ln(GVC_part_{it}) + \varepsilon_{ijt}\end{aligned}$$

- **14 countries (7 advanced, 6 emerging)**
- **Estimations for 1980-2012 and 1995-2012**
- **2 alternative GVC integration measures:**
 - **Vertical specialisation index (only backward integration)**
 - **GVC participation (based on decomposition of gross exports)**



Data sources



We observe increasing vertical specialization, especially by EMEs

Vertical Specialisation Index (VSI)

2010=100




Source: update of Amador & Cabral, 2009.


Global Crisis induced a reversal in GVC participation intensity

GVC participation index

2010=100



$$GVC\ Participation_{it} = VS1_{it} + FV_{ijt}$$



Source: authors' calculations based on WIOD.

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
Regression results for import values, 1995-2011

	Advanced economies Fixed effects with AR(1) dist.		Emerging economies Fixed effects with AR(1) dist.	
Lagged dep.				
TFE	1.51***	1.41***	1.42***	1.40***
<i>Long-term coef.</i>				
Relative prices	-0.02	-0.05*	-0.023	-0.06
<i>Long-term coef.</i>				
ER	0.43***	0.3***	0.40***	0.38***
<i>Long-term coef.</i>				
TFE*GVC_part	0.05***		0.03***	
<i>Long-term coef.</i>				


- Check for influence of prices -> deflate all variables
- Start estimation in 1980
- Estimate GVC participation separately and as interaction term

Recursive estimates, including TFE*GVC-part interaction term


Fixed effects with AR, advanced economies




Fixed effects with AR, emerging economies




with interaction term




Intfe_d_part



with interaction term



Intfe_d_part






Regression results for import volumes, 1995-2011




	Advanced economies			Emerging economies		
	1995-2012					
GDP	2.63***	2.69***	2.62***	2.11***	1.32***	1.10***
Rel. MP	-0.74***	-0.73***	-0.73***	-0.73***	-0.69***	-0.67***
ER	-0.063**	-0.063**	-0.064**	-0.43***	-0.39***	-0.36***
VSI		0.060***			0.31***	
GDP*VSI			0.014***			0.069***
total GDP & interact			2.66 (2.65-2.67)			1.33 (1.22-1.41)
	1980-2012					
GDP	2.29***	2.08***	1.99***	2.13***	1.31***	1.04***
Rel. MP	-0.84***	-0.84***	-0.84***	-0.34***	-0.31***	-0.30***
ER	0.0028	0.0049	0.0058	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.19***
VSI		0.085***			0.32***	
GDP*VSI			0.021***			0.075***
total GDP & interact			2.06 (2.02-2.09)			1.25 (1.04-1.4)

Recursive estimates, including TFE*VSI interaction

Advanced economies



Emerging economies



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Conclusions and way forward

- Countries with stronger involvement in GVCs tend to import more, beyond the effect of the demand variable
- Omitting these variables leads to higher estimates of income elasticities
- Sensitivity to GVC-participation higher in EMEs
- Among structural factors, a deceleration in the expansion of global value chains would have a dampening effect on trade.
- On the agenda: more (and proper) robustness checks, proper measurement of GVC participation, allow for time-varying effect of GVC-participation

