Hungary

The remarkable average GDP growth of around 5% in 2022 disguises some worrying trends, particularly a marked decline in the growth rate from quarter to quarter. Overheating (induced by economic policies pursued ahead of last April’s general election) resulted in a mounting macroeconomic imbalance. The restrictive measures introduced to address this imbalance coincided with a dramatic deterioration in terms of trade in the wake of the war in Ukraine, soaring inflation (due to both internal and external factors) and a low ebb in EU transfers. The deceleration in growth will yield to recession in the first two or three quarters of 2023 – a consequence of shrinking private consumption and investment, along with only a moderate expansion of exports. Annual GDP is expected to decline slightly this year. Fiscal and external balances may improve somewhat, but will not be sustainable in the medium term. Annual inflation will likely peak early in the year at about 26% and will thereafter subside gradually. In principle, the door is still open for both the EU’s RRF and its traditional Cohesion Policy transfers; but if the Commission insists on its preconditions being met before any disbursement, we can expect protracted quarrels with the Hungarian government – and a delay in actual money flows (or even their repeated suspension). EU resources are already badly needed in the short term to ensure a soft landing and a return to more balanced growth.
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FORECAST* |
Main Economic Indicators | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
Population, 1000 persons | 9750 | 9710 | 9684 | . | . | . |
GDP, real change in % | -4.5 | 7.1 | 4.6 | -1.0 | 1.7 | 2.5 |
GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 22380 | 24320 | 27290 | . | . | . |
Gross industrial production, real change in % | -6.0 | 9.6 | 5.7 | . | . | . |
Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.5 |
Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 1149 | 1224 | 1318 | . | . | . |
Consumer prices, % p.a. | 3.4 | 5.2 | 15.3 | 16.0 | 10.0 | 6.0 |
Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -7.5 | -7.1 | -6.1 | -4.7 | -4.0 | -3.5 |
Public debt in % of GDP | 79.3 | 76.8 | 76.4 | . | . | . |
Current account in % of GDP | -1.1 | -4.2 | -7.8 | -5.0 | -4.6 | -3.5 |
FDI inflow, EUR m | 3169 | 7065 | 9674 | . | . | . |
Gross external debt in % of GDP | 80.9 | 84.6 | 83.7 | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
publication_icon
Monthly Report No. 1/2023
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Selena Duraković, Richard Grieveson, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Bernd Christoph Ströhm, Maryna Tverdostup, Nina Vujanović, Zuzana Zavarská and Adam Żurawski
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2023
44 pages including 4 Tables and 16 Figures
Details
publication_icon
Executive summary
Branimir Jovanović
in: Bracing for the Winter
wiiw Forecast Report No. Autumn 2022, October 2022 , pp. I-VIII
Details
The remarkable average GDP growth of around 5% in 2022 disguises some worrying trends, particularly a marked decline in the growth rate from quarter to quarter. Overheating (induced by economic policies pursued ahead of last April’s general election) resulted in a mounting macroeconomic imbalance. The restrictive measures introduced to address this imbalance coincided with a dramatic deterioration in terms of trade in the wake of the war in Ukraine, soaring inflation (due to both internal and external factors) and a low ebb in EU transfers. The deceleration in growth will yield to recession in the first two or three quarters of 2023 – a consequence of shrinking private consumption and investment, along with only a moderate expansion of exports. Annual GDP is expected to decline slightly this year. Fiscal and external balances may improve somewhat, but will not be sustainable in the medium term. Annual inflation will likely peak early in the year at about 26% and will thereafter subside gradually. In principle, the door is still open for both the EU’s RRF and its traditional Cohesion Policy transfers; but if the Commission insists on its preconditions being met before any disbursement, we can expect protracted quarrels with the Hungarian government – and a delay in actual money flows (or even their repeated suspension). EU resources are already badly needed in the short term to ensure a soft landing and a return to more balanced growth.