Moldova
| FORECAST* | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Economic Indicators | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
| Population, 1000 persons | 2529 | 2458 | . | . | . | . |
| GDP, real change in % | -4.6 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 |
| GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 10290 | 11450 | . | . | . | . |
| Gross industrial production, real change in % | -5.1 | -3.6 | -1.1 | . | . | . |
| Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 3.1 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
| Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 525 | 622 | . | . | . | . |
| Consumer prices, % p.a. | 28.7 | 13.4 | 4.7 | 8.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -3.2 | -5.2 | -4.8 | -4.8 | -4.5 | -4.0 |
| Public debt in % of GDP | 35.0 | 35.3 | . | . | . | . |
| Current account in % of GDP | -17.1 | -11.4 | -12.8 | -12.0 | -12.0 | -11.0 |
| FDI inflow, EUR m | 557 | 330 | . | . | . | . |
| Gross external debt in % of GDP | 65.3 | 59.5 | . | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
publication_icon
Monthly Report No. 1/2025
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Selena Duraković, Meryem Gökten, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Dzmitry Kruk, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Emilia Penkova-Pearson, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Marko Sošić, Bernd Christoph Ströhm and Maryna Tverdostup
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2025
50 pages including 6 Tables and 13 Figures
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Executive summary
Olga Pindyuk
in: The Crisis is Over, but its Scarring Effects are Hindering Recovery
wiiw Forecast Report No. Spring 2024, April 2024 , pp. I-VII
Details
Economic growth slowed in H2 2024, driven by a poor harvest. This resulted in modest GDP growth of about 1% for the year overall. While investment activity was robust and household consumption rose as inflation subsided, the external balance deteriorated. The outlook for 2025 remains bleak. The year began with a fresh crisis, as Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas to Transnistria, while Gazprom also refused to deliver through Romania. While the rest of Moldova imports gas from Western sources, much of the country’s electricity depends on a power plant located in Transnistria, which can only partially switch from gas to coal. Although Romania has stepped in to increase the export of electricity to Moldova, it is much more expensive. As a result, electricity tariffs have surged by 80%, which will likely lead to an acceleration of inflation to 8% in 2025, up from 4.7% in 2024. In response, in January the National Bank of Moldova introduced a 2 percentage point increase in the policy rate (to 5.6%), and further hikes will follow. Wide current account and fiscal deficits will persist in 2025, to be financed by international donors and creditors. This assistance is critical, especially as the country’s EU-oriented path relies on a fragile parliamentary majority that will face a crucial test during the elections expected mid-year. Resolving the energy crisis and improving living standards are vital to keep the pro-EU government in place. While the severe crisis in Transnistria could push the region into seeking compromise with the rest of Moldova, Russia’s interference in the matter may make the situation worse.