Ukraine
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A summer drought plus large-scale Russian attacks on energy infrastructure provided significant economic headwinds in 2024, but the economy continued to show impressive resilience. The European Council agreed a EUR 50bn Ukraine Facility in February 2024, and in October the G7 finally agreed a USD 50bn loan to Ukraine, backed by frozen Russian assets. External financing pressures eased substantially as a result. Moreover, in its final weeks in office, the Biden administration released a further USD 6bn in budgetary and military aid for Ukraine, providing at least a short-term economic and security boost. For 2025 we expect meagre growth of 3%, held back by the continued impact of the war and a pause in monetary loosening (and even potentially further small hikes in the coming months), due to higher inflation riding on the back of food price rises. US President Donald Trump will force negotiations with Russia to start sooner than would otherwise have been the case, but this is unlikely to lead to a quick end to the war (and consequently more rapid economic recovery). In 2026-2027 we see growth accelerating to around 5%, as monetary policy is loosened and as the war moves closer to at least a ceasefire. However, if Donald Trump sharply curtails financial and/or military aid to Ukraine, or forces Ukraine into a ‘peace’ on terms favourable to Russia and without watertight security guarantees for Ukraine, this will have a further negative impact on the economic outlook.
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FORECAST* |
Main Economic Indicators | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
Population, 1000 persons | 35000 | 36700 | . | . | . | . |
GDP, real change in % | -28.8 | 5.5 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 10210 | 11170 | . | . | . | . |
Gross industrial production, real change in % | -36.7 | 6.8 | . | . | . | . |
Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 25.0 | 20.0 | 15.0 | 12.0 | 10.5 | 9.5 |
Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 437 | 441 | . | . | . | . |
Consumer prices, % p.a. | 20.2 | 12.9 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 7.0 | 5.5 |
Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -16.1 | -20.1 | -19.0 | -16.0 | -10.0 | -10.0 |
Public debt in % of GDP | 77.8 | 83.3 | 95.7 | . | . | . |
Current account in % of GDP | 4.9 | -5.3 | -9.0 | -9.0 | -8.0 | -7.0 |
FDI inflow, EUR m | 210 | 4227 | . | . | . | . |
Gross external debt in % of GDP | 79.7 | 86.8 | . | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
publication_icon
Monthly Report No. 1/2025
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Selena Duraković, Meryem Gökten, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Dzmitry Kruk, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Emilia Penkova-Pearson, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Marko Sošić, Bernd Christoph Ströhm and Maryna Tverdostup
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2025
50 pages including 6 Tables and 13 Figures
Details
publication_icon
Executive summary
Olga Pindyuk
in: The Crisis is Over, but its Scarring Effects are Hindering Recovery
wiiw Forecast Report No. Spring 2024, April 2024 , pp. I-VII
Details
A summer drought plus large-scale Russian attacks on energy infrastructure provided significant economic headwinds in 2024, but the economy continued to show impressive resilience. The European Council agreed a EUR 50bn Ukraine Facility in February 2024, and in October the G7 finally agreed a USD 50bn loan to Ukraine, backed by frozen Russian assets. External financing pressures eased substantially as a result. Moreover, in its final weeks in office, the Biden administration released a further USD 6bn in budgetary and military aid for Ukraine, providing at least a short-term economic and security boost. For 2025 we expect meagre growth of 3%, held back by the continued impact of the war and a pause in monetary loosening (and even potentially further small hikes in the coming months), due to higher inflation riding on the back of food price rises. US President Donald Trump will force negotiations with Russia to start sooner than would otherwise have been the case, but this is unlikely to lead to a quick end to the war (and consequently more rapid economic recovery). In 2026-2027 we see growth accelerating to around 5%, as monetary policy is loosened and as the war moves closer to at least a ceasefire. However, if Donald Trump sharply curtails financial and/or military aid to Ukraine, or forces Ukraine into a ‘peace’ on terms favourable to Russia and without watertight security guarantees for Ukraine, this will have a further negative impact on the economic outlook.