Serbia
| FORECAST* | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Economic Indicators | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
| Population, 1000 persons | 6664 | 6623 | . | . | . | . |
| GDP, real change in % | 2.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.7 |
| GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 16450 | 18660 | . | . | . | . |
| Gross industrial production, real change in % | 1.9 | 2.6 | . | . | . | . |
| Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 9.5 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 7.8 |
| Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 880 | 1011 | . | . | . | . |
| Consumer prices, % p.a. | 11.7 | 12.1 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.5 |
| Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -3.0 | -2.1 | -1.0 | -1.5 | -1.7 | -2.0 |
| Public debt in % of GDP | 52.9 | 48.4 | . | . | . | . |
| Current account in % of GDP | -6.6 | -2.4 | -4.0 | -3.8 | -3.6 | -3.4 |
| FDI inflow, EUR m | 4432 | 4564 | . | . | . | . |
| Gross external debt in % of GDP | 66.0 | 60.4 | . | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
publication_icon
Monthly Report No. 1/2025
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Selena Duraković, Meryem Gökten, Richard Grieveson, Maciej J. Grodzicki, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Dzmitry Kruk, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Emilia Penkova-Pearson, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Marko Sošić, Bernd Christoph Ströhm and Maryna Tverdostup
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2025
50 pages including 6 Tables and 13 Figures
publication_icon
Executive summary
Olga Pindyuk
in: The Crisis is Over, but its Scarring Effects are Hindering Recovery
wiiw Forecast Report No. Spring 2024, April 2024 , pp. I-VII
Details
Last year saw inflation stabilise at around 4.5%, the growth in real wages remain at 9% and unemployment drop to 8%. FDI inflows stayed solid at around 6% of GDP, while public investment, at nearly 7% of GDP, was among the highest in Europe. Yet, despite these rosy figures, GDP growth in 2024 is estimated to have been a relatively low 3.8% – far removed from what the country needs for more rapid convergence with EU standards of living. There was also a marked slowdown in the second half of the year. This raises concerns about the ability of the country’s current growth model – based as it is on FDI attraction and public investment – to deliver higher and more sustained growth. As we have argued repeatedly, stronger domestic private investment is needed for this; but the current government has shown little willingness to implement proper industrial and innovation policies to this end. That is why we do not see growth in the coming years exceeding 4%. Indeed, we believe it could even slow a little on account of more sluggish growth in real wages and reduced FDI inflows. On the political front, the country is witnessing its biggest protests since the fall of President Milošević back in 2000. These are being led by students, who have been demonstrating for two months against government corruption and negligence – though the spark was provided by the collapse of a concrete canopy at the Novi Sad railway station in November 2024, which resulted in 15 fatalities. While protests have long been a fixture of Serbia’s political landscape and are unlikely to destabilise the country in the short term, they could very well signal the beginning of the end for President Vučić.