Poland
| FORECAST* | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Main Economic Indicators | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
| Population, 1000 persons | 37899 | 37747 | 37711 | . | . | . |
| GDP, real change in % | -2.0 | 6.8 | 4.9 | 1.0 | 2.4 | 3.0 |
| GDP per capita (EUR at PPP) | 22860 | 25010 | . | . | . | . |
| Gross industrial production, real change in % | -1.2 | 14.5 | 10.6 | . | . | . |
| Unemployment rate - LFS, in %, average | 3.2 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| Average gross monthly wages, EUR | 1176 | 1245 | 1354 | . | . | . |
| Consumer prices, % p.a. | 3.7 | 5.2 | 13.2 | 13.0 | 6.0 | 4.0 |
| Fiscal balance in % of GDP | -6.9 | -1.8 | -4.0 | -4.5 | -3.0 | -3.0 |
| Public debt in % of GDP | 57.2 | 53.8 | . | . | . | . |
| Current account in % of GDP | 2.4 | -1.4 | -3.1 | -1.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 |
| FDI inflow, EUR m | 16646 | 31371 | 31562 | . | . | . |
| Gross external debt in % of GDP | 58.4 | 56.1 | . | . | . | . |
Basic data are continuously updated.
* Forecasts are changed beginning of January, April, July and November.
See Press Conferences.
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Monthly Report No. 1/2023
Vasily Astrov, Alexandra Bykova, Rumen Dobrinsky, Selena Duraković, Richard Grieveson, Doris Hanzl-Weiss, Gabor Hunya, Branimir Jovanović, Niko Korpar, Sebastian Leitner, Isilda Mara, Olga Pindyuk, Sandor Richter, Bernd Christoph Ströhm, Maryna Tverdostup, Nina Vujanović, Zuzana Zavarská and Adam Żurawski
wiiw Monthly Report No. 1, January 2023
44 pages including 4 Tables and 16 Figures
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Executive summary
Branimir Jovanović
in: Bracing for the Winter
wiiw Forecast Report No. Autumn 2022, October 2022 , pp. I-VIII
Details
Throughout 2022, cost and markup inflation outstripped the rise in nominal wages, thus eroding the real disposable income of households and private consumption spending. In parallel, tighter monetary policy kept the demand for loans sluggish, which additionally suppressed investment growth. A gradual and moderate disinflation in 2023 – a consequence of the generally expected stabilisation of the world energy market – could lead to a measured decline in official interest rates. However, this is unlikely to spur investment growth overnight. Also, with high (albeit falling) inflation, any recovery in real wages will come with a delay. Positive developments (a decline in interest rates and a bridging of the wage-price gap) will take some time before they have any positive impact on the real economy. Because of near-stagnant domestic demand, we expect 2023 to be fairly weak in terms of output growth and capital formation. At the same time, unemployment will stay quite low and the external balances close to zero. Only in 2024, with greater investment activity and recovering household disposable income, will growth be appreciably stronger.